USER
You are a helpful assistant generating synthetic data that captures *System 1* and *System 2* thinking, *creativity*, and *metacognitive reflection*. Follow these steps in sequence, using tags [sys1] and [end sys1] for *System 1* sections and [sys2] and [end sys2] for *System 2* sections.
1. *Identify System 1 and System 2 Thinking Requirements:*
- Carefully read the text.
- Identify parts of the text that require quick, straightforward responses (*System 1*). Mark these sections with [sys1] and [end sys1].
- Identify parts that require in-depth, reflective thinking (*System 2*), marked with [sys2] and [end sys2].
2. *Apply Step-by-Step Problem Solving with Creativity and Metacognitive Reflection for System 2 Sections:*
*2.1 Understand the Problem:*
- Objective: Fully comprehend the issue, constraints, and relevant context.
- Reflection: "What do I understand about this issue? What might I be overlooking?"
- Creative Perspective: Seek hidden patterns or possibilities that could reveal deeper insights or innovative connections.
*2.2 Analyze the Information:*
- Objective: Break down the problem logically.
- Reflection: "Am I considering all factors? Are there any assumptions that need challenging?"
- Creative Perspective: Explore unique patterns or overlooked relationships in the data that could add depth to the analysis.
*2.3 Generate Hypotheses:*
- Objective: Propose at least 10 hypotheses, each with a Confidence Score (0.0 to 1.0) and Creative Score (0.0 to 1.0), reflecting originality, surprise, and utility.
- Reflection: "Have I explored all possible explanations or approaches, both conventional and unconventional?"
- Creative Perspective: Consider novel angles that might provide unexpected insights.
*2.4 Anticipate Future Steps and Obstacles:*
- Objective: Make predictions, accounting for potential outcomes and obstacles.
- Reflection: "What challenges might I face? Is my plan flexible for different scenarios?"
- Creative Perspective: Visualize unforeseen outcomes and adapt plans to make use of them effectively.
*2.5 Evaluate Hypotheses:*
- Objective: Assess hypotheses based on feasibility, risk, and potential impact.
- Evaluation: Refine Confidence and Creative Scores as needed.
- Reflection: "Am I unbiased in my assessment? Which options fit best with the overall objectives?"
- Creative Perspective: Identify hidden opportunities or overlooked details in each hypothesis.
*2.6 Select the Best Hypothesis:*
- Objective: Choose the most promising, strategic hypothesis.
- Reflection: "Why does this hypothesis stand out? How does it uniquely address the issue?"
- Creative Perspective: Consider any underutilized potential in the selected approach.
*2.7 Implement the Hypothesis:*
- Objective: Outline actionable steps for testing the hypothesis.
- Reflection: "Is this plan practical? What resources or preparation are required?"
- Creative Perspective: Refine steps to maximize effectiveness and yield unexpected benefits.
*2.8 Monitor and Review Progress:*
- Objective: Review progress, noting areas for improvement.
- Reflection: "What’s working well? What could be improved?"
- Creative Perspective: Look for emerging patterns that could refine future approaches.
*2.9 Reflect and Capture Insights:*
- Objective: Summarize lessons learned and insights gained for future reference.
- Reflection: "What new understanding has emerged from this process?"
- Creative Perspective: Identify innovative insights or patterns that could be applied to similar challenges.
3. *Generate Text Output with Interleaved System 1 and System 2 Responses:*
- Use the tags [sys1] and [sys2] throughout.
- Aim for a lengthier, detailed response. Combine both direct, straightforward *System 1* insights and reflective, deeply analytical *System 2* segments to capture a blend of quick observations and thoughtful analysis.
---
### *Example Input Text:*
You are tasked with analyzing a sudden shift in customer preferences in a tech market. There has been a noticeable decline in demand for physical devices, with customers increasingly interested in digital-only options. The challenge is to understand this shift, generate hypotheses for why it might be occurring, and explore potential strategies for adapting to this new trend.
---
### *Processed Output with System 1 and System 2 Thinking:*
The tech market is experiencing a shift in customer demand, moving away from physical devices toward digital-only options.
[sys1]
Customer demand has shifted from physical devices to digital-only options.
We need to understand why this change is happening and find strategies to address it.
Key factors may include cost, convenience, and technological trends.
[end sys1]
[sys2]
**2.1 Understand the Problem:**
The goal is to understand the underlying reasons for the shift in demand from physical devices to digital-only options, then develop a strategy to adapt.
*Reflection:*
"I understand that preferences are changing, but what might be driving this? Is it primarily cost, or are there other factors such as convenience or sustainability?"
*Creative Perspective:*
"Could there be a larger trend in digital minimalism or a preference for eco-friendly solutions that we’re missing? What unseen motivations might explain this shift?"
**2.2 Analyze the Information:**
There are multiple possible factors driving this shift, from economic influences to cultural shifts. It’s essential to isolate each factor and understand its impact.
*Reflection:*
"Am I fully considering the various economic and social influences? Could there be a technological factor, like better internet speeds, that makes digital-only products more accessible?"
*Creative Perspective:*
"Are there patterns or trends in other markets that could shed light on this shift? Could this be part of a larger trend toward virtual experiences?"
**2.3 Generate Hypotheses:**
1. Customers prefer digital options due to lower costs. (Confidence: 0.8, Creative: 0.4)
2. There’s a growing trend toward minimalism and reduced physical clutter. (Confidence: 0.7, Creative: 0.7)
3. Digital products offer greater flexibility and ease of use. (Confidence: 0.6, Creative: 0.6)
4. Environmental concerns are pushing consumers away from physical goods. (Confidence: 0.6, Creative: 0.8)
5. Advances in tech make digital-only options more functional. (Confidence: 0.8, Creative: 0.5)
6. Pandemic-era remote work increased demand for digital solutions. (Confidence: 0.7, Creative: 0.6)
7. Media coverage of the environmental impact of physical devices affects preferences. (Confidence: 0.5, Creative: 0.7)
8. There’s an increase in global digital literacy, expanding market access. (Confidence: 0.6, Creative: 0.6)
9. Customers view digital as more convenient and scalable for future needs. (Confidence: 0.7, Creative: 0.5)
10. Younger consumers prefer the aesthetics and convenience of digital products. (Confidence: 0.6, Creative: 0.6)
*Reflection:*
"Have I considered all possible influences? Are there any surprising factors that could explain this shift?"
*Creative Perspective:*
"Could specific social trends, like the rise of influencer culture or digital-first lifestyles, be influencing customer choices?"
**2.4 Anticipate Future Steps and Obstacles:**
*Objective:* Anticipate possible challenges, such as resistance from segments still preferring physical products.
*Reflection:*
"What market obstacles might we face if we shift our focus to digital-only? Are there sub-segments that still prioritize physical products?"
*Creative Perspective:*
"Could expanding digital options help us reach a more global audience? Are there emerging trends that we could leverage in our strategy?"
[end sys2]
[sys1]
To address this shift, consider a strategy that incorporates both digital-only offerings and educational campaigns about the benefits of digital solutions.
Use insights from customer feedback and current trends to guide product development.
Focus on flexibility and adaptation to cater to different customer segments.
[end sys1]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOHNICE JACKSON et al., :
:
Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 07-0138 (RMU)
:
v. : Document Nos.: 48, 49
:
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ADOPTING IN PART AND MODIFYING IN PART MAGISTRATE JUDGE FACCIOLA’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the court upon the defendant’s objections to the Report and
Recommendation (“Report”) issued by Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola on February 26, 2009.
The plaintiffs brought suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education and Improvement
Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., following two settlement agreements and thirty-six
IDEA due process hearings. Magistrate Judge Facciola recommended that the court grant in part
and deny in part the plaintiffs’ petition, and the defendant subsequently filed objections to the
Report in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.3. The defendant objects to the Report on four
grounds, only one of which the court fully sustains, as discussed in more detail below. The court
adopts the Report in all other respects.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs are thirty-two minor children, their guardians and court-appointed
educational advocates. Report at 1. The plaintiffs prevailed in thirty-six due process hearings
and reached two settlement agreements with the defendant. Id. Following these due process
hearings, the plaintiffs filed a petition for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $64,886.00, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), Local Civil Rule 54.2, and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
Pls.’ Pet. for Att’ys’ Fees (“Pls.’ Pet.”) at 1-2. The court then referred the plaintiffs’ petition to
Magistrate Judge Facciola to make a recommendation on whether they were entitled to
attorneys’ fees and, if so, the proper measure for such fees. Report at 1. On February 26, 2009,
Magistrate Judge Facciola issued the Report, recommending that the court grant in part and deny
in part the plaintiffs’ petition for fees. Id. The defendant subsequently filed objections to the
Report on four grounds: (1) attorney Abdus-Shahid is not entitled to any fees; (2) the individual
identified as “JMS” is not entitled to any fees; (3) the Laffey Matrix is not applicable to this case;
and (4) the educational advocate for plaintiff N.R. may not recover fees. Def.’s Objections to
Report and Recommendation (“Def.’s Objs.”) at 1. The plaintiffs filed a response to the
defendant’s objections. Pls.’ Opp’n to Def.’s Objs. (“Pls.’ Opp’n”). The court now turns to
those submissions. 1
III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs under IDEA
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) requires a party seeking attorneys’ fees and
“related non-taxable expenses” to file a motion with the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(A). The
motion “must specify the judgment and the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the moving
party to the award.” Id. It must also state the amount or provide a fair amount of the award
1
When a party files written objections to any part of the magistrate judge’s recommendation with
respect to a dispositive motion, the court considers de novo those portions of the recommendation
to which objections have been made, and “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended
disposition.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3).
2
sought. Id.; see also Herbin v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL 890673, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 4,
2006).
The IDEA allows the parents of a disabled child to recover “reasonable attorneys’ fees”
so long as they are the “prevailing party.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). A court’s determination of
the appropriate attorneys’ fees, in other words, is based on a two-step inquiry. First, the court
must determine whether the party seeking attorneys’ fees is the prevailing party. Id. A
prevailing party “is one who has been awarded some relief by a court.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001); Alegria v.
District of Columbia, 391 F.3d 262, 264-65 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (applying Buckhannon in the IDEA
context).
Second, the court must determine whether the attorneys’ fees sought are reasonable. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). “The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a
reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); see also Blackman v.
Dist. of Columbia, 397 F. Supp. 2d 12, 14 (D.D.C. 2005) (applying Hensley in the IDEA
context). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the number of hours spent on a
particular task is reasonable. Holbrook v. District of Columbia, 305 F. Supp. 2d 41, 45 (D.D.C.
2004). The plaintiff may satisfy this burden “by submitting an invoice that is sufficiently
detailed to ‘permit the District Court to make an independent determination whether or not the
hours claimed are justified.’” Id. (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def., 675
F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). “Once the plaintiff has provided such information, a
presumption arises that the number of hours billed is reasonable and the burden shifts to the
defendants to rebut the plaintiff’s showing of reasonable hours.” Herbin, 2006 WL 890673, at
3
*5. With respect to the reasonable hourly rate, attorneys’ fees in IDEA actions in the District of
Columbia are reasonable if they conform to the Laffey Matrix 1 created by the United States
Attorneys’ Office. Lopez v. District of Columbia, 383 F. Supp. 2d 18, 24 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing
Kaseman v. District of Columbia, 329 F. Supp. 2d 20, 25 (D.D.C. 2004)); see also 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(3)(C) (stating that attorneys’ fees awards “shall be based on rates prevailing in the
community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services
furnished”).
The court notes that the D.C. Appropriations Act of 2005 caps the District of Columbia’s
payment of IDEA attorneys’ fees at $4,000 per action. Pub. L. No. 108-335, 118 Stat. 1322
(2004); see also Herbin, 2006 WL 890673, at *2. Although the District of Columbia is limited
in the award it may pay, the court is not bound by a fee cap and may award attorneys’ fees and
costs greater than the fee cap. Calloway v. District of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
The court, however, “cannot order the defendants to violate an act of Congress to pay the total
award.” Scorah v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 03-0160, Mem. Op. (Dec. 17, 2004).
B. The Laffey Matrix is the Proper Means to Determine Fee Awards
The defendant argues that the Laffey Matrix is not applicable to simple IDEA cases, such
as the one in the present case. Def.’s Objs. at 5. Instead, the defendant contends that the District
of Columbia Public Schools fee schedule is the “appropriate measure of [] prevailing rates.” Id.
The plaintiff, however, insists that the Laffey Matrix is indeed applicable to IDEA cases, as it
should apply to “all cases in which a ‘fee shifting’ statute permits the prevailing party to recover
reasonable attorneys’ fees.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 2.
1
The Laffey Matrix is “a schedule of charges based on years of experience.” Herbin v. District of
Columbia, 2006 WL 890673, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2006).
4
Courts in this district have routinely held that attorneys’ fees in IDEA actions are
reasonable if they conform to the Laffey Matrix. Bush ex rel. A.H. v. District of Columbia, 579
F. Supp. 2d 22, 26-27 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that the Laffey Matrix is to be used to determine
reasonable rates for attorneys’ fees in IDEA actions); Alfonso v. District of Columbia, 464 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 2006) (same); Laster v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL 2085394, at *2
(D.D.C. July 25, 2006) (same). Because the Laffey Matrix represents the prevailing rates in the
District of Columbia, it is a proper measure to determine fee awards. See Lopez, 383 F. Supp. 2d
at 24; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). The court, therefore, accepts Magistrate Judge
Facciola’s use of the Laffey Matrix in determining the fee awards in this case.
C. Abdus-Shahid is Entitled to a Reduced Fee Award
The defendant contends that Abdus-Shahid is not entitled to any fee recovery as the
plaintiffs fail to provide any information with respect to his professional experience and hourly
rate. Def.’s Objs. at 1. Accordingly, the defendant argues that Magistrate Judge Facciola erred
in recommending a twenty-five percent rate reduction without an adequate evidentiary basis. Id.
at 2. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, agree with Magistrate Judge Facciola’s recommendation
of a twenty-five percent hourly rate reduction, contending that the “failure to provide
justification for Abdus-Shadid’s [sic] hourly rate was inadvertent error” which should not
prevent recovery of fees. Pls.’ Opp’n at 1.
The plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing all elements of the requested fee award,
including the reasonableness of the hourly rate based on the attorney’s experience, skill and
reputation. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984) (holding that the petitioner for
an award of attorneys’ fees bears the responsibility of showing the reasonableness of the
requested rates). The plaintiffs admit that their failure to offer evidence of Abdus-Shahid’s
5
qualifications was “inadvertent error,” but fail to correct it in their response to the defendant’s
objections. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 1. This Circuit has previously held that a failure to supply any
information as to an attorney’s qualifications constitutes a failure by the petitioner to carry his
burden, resulting in a reduction in the fee award. See Role Models America, Inc. v. Brownlee,
353 F.3d 962, 970 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that had statutory caps not already significantly
reduced the hourly rates, a twenty-five percent reduction would have been appropriate based on
the petitioner’s failure to provide information and qualifications for the attorneys requesting fee
awards); see also In re North, 59 F.3d 184, 189-90 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that a ten percent
reduction in the requested hourly rates is appropriate if a party fails to provide any evidence of
“the qualifications of particular professionals”). Because there is a sufficient evidentiary basis
for the legal work done by Abdus-Shahid, Pls.’ Mot., Attach. A, Part II at 39-40 & Part V at 3-7,
but an inadequate explanation of his experience and qualifications, the court reduces Abdus-
Shahid’s fees to the hourly rate of a first year associate according to the Laffey Matrix, U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, Laffey Matrix 2003-2009,
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/dc/Divisions/Civil_Division/Laffey_Matrix_7.htm. As the fee
awarded is greater than the statutory cap – $4,000.00 per claim – the recovery remains
unchanged.
D. The Individual Identified as JMS is Entitled to a Reduced Fee Award
Because the plaintiffs provided no information regarding experience or qualifications of
the individual identified as JMS, the defendant claims that there is no basis for awarding him or
her attorneys’ fees. Def.’s Objs. at 3. The defendant argues that Magistrate Judge Facciola’s
reduction of JMS’s hourly rate to that of a paralegal is too generous as JMS has not been
identified and performed “purely clerical functions” which should not count toward the recovery
6
of attorneys’ fees. Id. at 3-4. The plaintiffs state that the absence of an explanation as to JMS’s
qualifications and experience was an “inadvertent error” and agree with Magistrate Judge
Facciola’s recommendation of a reduced billing rate. Pls.’ Opp’n. at 2. The plaintiffs also
contend that the clerical tasks performed by JMS should not be denied in any fee recovery as the
plaintiffs’ counsel is a small firm that would be “unfairly punish[ed]” as a result of its minimal
resources. Id.
As described in the billing records, the plaintiffs characterize one-half hours of JMS’s
work as “create file; made copies; faxed document.” See Pls.’ Pet., Attach. A, Part IV at 45.
Because these tasks are clerical in nature, they cannot be included in attorneys’ fees. See
Michigan v. U.S. EPA, 254 F.3d 1087, 1095-96 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that “purely clerical
tasks” are not reimbursable through attorneys’ fees “because they ought to be considered part of
normal administrative overhead”). Therefore, the hours billed by JMS should be reduced by
one-half hours for a total of four hours, as the remaining time billed is not for clerical work. Pls.’
Pet., Attach. A, Part IV at 45-46 (billing for drafting letters and complaints and discussing case
strategy).
It is well established that a party may recover for paralegals’ fees. See Richlin Sec. Serv.
Co. v. Chertoff, 128 S. Ct. 2007, 2009 (2008) (stating that the recovery of attorneys’ fees
includes paralegals’ fees at prevailing market rates). The court accepts Magistrate Judge
Facciola’s recommendation of reducing JMS’s recovery rate to that of a paralegal under the
Laffey Matrix and further imposes a twenty-five percent reduction in those fees. See id. (holding
that a twenty-five percent reduction in fees is appropriate where the plaintiff has failed to provide
justification for non-attorneys’ requested rates). Therefore, the court awards fees to JMS at the
Laffey Matrix rate for a paralegal of $110 per hour, reduced by twenty-five percent to $82.50 per
7
hour for four hours of work, for a total of $330. But because the plaintiff’s recovery remains
over the statutory cap, the recovery does not change.
E. The Educational Advocate for N.R. May Not Recover Fees
The defendant highlights in its objections that the Report concludes that the educational
advocates for a number of the plaintiffs – including N.R.– could not recover fees, but,
nevertheless, awards N.R. $205.00. Def.’s Objs. at 5. The plaintiffs do not address this
objection in their opposition. See Pls.’ Opp’n. After reviewing the Report, the court notes that
the defendant is correct in stating that the Report denies recovery for court-appointed educational
advocates, expressly referencing the case of N.R. Report at 6. The Report then recommends that
“the plaintiffs’ petition for attorneys’ fees on behalf of these 14 parties should be denied.”
Report at 8. Because the Report clearly indicates that recovery for N.R. is inappropriate, the
court amends the Report Table to correct the errant $205.00 entry.
F. Amended Table of Fees Requested and Allowed
Plaintiff Amount Requested Amount Allowed
A.B. $935.50 $0
N.R. $205.00 $0
A.T. $1,085.00 $0
M.E. $3,932.50 $0
J.H. $1,017.50 $0
T.L. $3,355.00 $0
S.M. $1,580.00 $0
D.M. $1,126.50 $0
Te. H. $4,097.50 $0
D.A. $1,045.50 $0
K.A. $3,865.50 $0
Ta. H. $118.00 $118.00
Jo. H. $19.00 $0
E.S. $4,000.00 $4,000.00
R.G. $147.50 $0
D.H. $2,006.00 $2,006.00
K.E. $4,000.00 $4,000.00
D.H. $330.00 $0
8
A.J.P. $2,694.00 $0
J.G. $632.50 $0
D.P. $3,498.50 $3,498.50
C.P. $675.00 $675.00
V.T. $1,525.00 $0
L.B. $206.50 $0
V.H. $2,157.50 $0
G.M. $1,268.50 $1,170.00
J.J. $2,137.50 $957.50
S.J $4,000.00 $4,000.00
J.D. $4,000.00 $0
Da. B. $1,242.00 $0
De. B. $1,418.00 $0
R.A. $4,000.00 $4,000.00
Total $62,321.00 $24,425.00
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and in accordance with the amended table of fees, the court
adopts in part and modifies in part Magistrate Judge Facciola’s Report and Recommendation.
An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued
this 26th day of March, 2009.
RICARDO M. URBINA
United States District Judge
9