turns-00017.parquet:22633
e88f3e834562293a41c8c7dcdegenerate_repetitionAbsentFinal dense release
USER
summarize this text: TiE traditional arguments for the existence of God have been fairly thoroughly criticised by philosophers. But the theologian can, if he wishes, accept this criticism. He can admit that no rational proof of God's existence is possible. And he can still retain all that is essential to his position, by holding that God's existence is known in some other, non-rational way. I think, however, that a more telling criticism can be made by way of the traditional problem of evil. Here it can be shown, not that religious beliefs lack rational support, but that they are positively irrational, that the several parts of the essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another, so that the theologian can maintain his position as a whole only by a much more extreme rejection of reason than in the former case. He must now be prepared to believe, not merely what cannot be proved, but what can be disproved from other beliefs that he also holds. The problem of evil, in the sense in which I shall be using the phrase, is a problem only for someone who believes that there is a God who is both omnnipotent and wholly good. And it is a logical problem, the problem of clarifying and reconciling a number of beliefs: it is not a scientific problem that might be solved by further observations, or a practical problem that might be solved by a decision or an action. These points are obvious; I mention them only because they are sometimes ignored by theologians, who sometimes parry a statement of the problem with such remarks as " Well, can you solve the problem yourself ? " or "This is a mystery which may be revealed to us later " or "Evil is something to be faced and overcome, not to be merely discussed " In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three. (The problem does not arise only for theists, but I shall discuss it in the form in which it presents itself for ordinary theism.) However, the contradiction does not arise immediately; to show it we need some additional premises, or perhaps some 200
ASSISTANT
This text states that traditional proofs of God's existence have been criticized by philosophers to the extent that they may no longer provide rational support for belief in God. However, the theologian can accept this and still believe in God based on non-rational means. The author argues that the problem of evil presents a stronger critique, claiming that the coexistence of a wholly good, omnipotent God with the presence of evil is not just unsupported by reason, but is actually irrational and self-contradictory. This contradiction is not immediately apparent, and additional premises are required to expose it. The problem of evil is characterized as a logical issue concerning the consistency of beliefs within theism, rather than a problem that could be resolved with further observation or action. Essentially, the problem challenges theologians to reconcile the existence of evil with the attributes of omnipotence and perfect goodness traditionally ascribed to God.